Dependency confusion attacks can occur when a package in a private registry does not exist in a public ecosystem's registry. Many package managers, used in build tooling, check public registries before private registries when downloading and installing packages. If an attacker learns the name of a package in someone's private registry, they can upload an identically named but malicious package to a public registry. Developers then mistakenly include the malicious public package in their software instead of the safe private package.
This attack can be particularly difficult to detect because it does not rely on typos like a typosquatting attack, but instead relies on and exploits misconfigured internal build servers to install a package of the same exact name but from a different registry. Without deep knowledge of the build pipeline or knowing where your package installer is looking first, you might not even know you're getting the wrong package.
In early 2021, a bug bounty researcher built the first proof of concept of this type of attack and was able to successfully demonstrate execution of his code inside more than 35 different organizations.
Updated 24 days ago